William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 1

2005

Child Witnesses: Common Ground and
Controversies in the Scientific Community
Livia L. Gilstrap
Kristina Fritz
Amanda Torres
Annika Melinder

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Gilstrap, Livia L.; Fritz, Kristina; Torres, Amanda; and Melinder, Annika (2005) "Child Witnesses: Common Ground and
Controversies in the Scientific Community," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 32: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Article 7

Gilstrap et al.: Child Witnesses: Common Ground and Controversies in the Scientifi
3GILSTRAP_PAGINATED.DOC

11/17/2005 9:47:26 AM

CHILD WITNESSES: COMMON GROUND AND
CONTROVERSIES IN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
Livia L. Gilstrap†, Kristina Fritz††, Amanda Torres†††,
††††
and Annika Melinder

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 60
II. BACKGROUND ON CHILD WITNESSES ....................................... 61
A. When Do Children Testify? .................................................. 61
B. What Lay People Know About Child Abuse and the
Influence of Experts ............................................................. 62
C. Scientific Expert Testimony—Non-Scientific Expert

† Livia L. Gilstrap is currently an Assistant Professor of Psychology at the
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. She joined the faculty in 2002 after
earning her Ph.D. in Developmental Psychology from Cornell University and her
B.A. in Psychology from Western Washington University in 1995. Her primary
areas of research are children’s memory and eyewitness testimony, with much of
her program research focused on children’s abilities to recall past events in the
context of conversations with adults. In addition to her academic position, Dr.
Gilstrap occasionally testifies as an expert witness.
†† Kristina Fritz is currently working on her M.A. in Clinical Psychology at the
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs and expects to graduate in May 2006.
She graduated from Concordia College in Moorhead, Minnesota, with a B.A. in
Psychology and Sociology. Her M.A. thesis is focused on interviewers’ nonverbal
behaviors and children’s suggestibility.
††† Amanda Torres is currently working on her Bachelors degree at the
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. She is double majoring in
Communications and Psychology, with a focus in Psychology, and has an
anticipated graduation date of May 2006. Her honors thesis focuses on jurors’
perceptions of child witnesses.
†††† Annika Melinder is a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Oslo,
Norway. She earned a degree in Psychology from the University of Gøteborg,
Sweden in 1990, her specialization in Clinical Psychology in 1997, and a Ph.D. in
Cognitive Psychology in 2004. Her main research interest concentrates around the
development of memory, in particular, memory for emotional events and source
monitoring functions.

59

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7
3GILSTRAP_PAGINATED.DOC

60

11/17/2005 9:47:26 AM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1

Testimony ........................................................................... 64
III. THREE AREAS OF CHILD WITNESS RESEARCH .......................... 65
A. Children’s Memory .............................................................. 65
1. What the Prosecution Should Know ................................ 65
2. What the Defense Should Know ...................................... 67
3. What the Whole Truth Is................................................ 67
B. Children’s Suggestibility....................................................... 68
1. What the Defense Should Know ...................................... 68
2. What the Prosecution Should Know ................................ 70
3. What the Whole Truth Is................................................ 71
C. Diagnosing Abuse ............................................................... 72
1. What the Prosecution Wants to Hear .............................. 72
2. What the Defense Wants to Hear..................................... 73
3. What the Whole Truth Is................................................ 78
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS................................................... 78
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than one hundred thousand child sexual abuse (“CSA”)
cases are investigated and found substantiated in the United States
1
each year. Substantiated cases are brought to the attention of
prosecutors who make decisions about whether to move forward
with the case. The jurors who hear these cases may hold
2
misconceptions about eyewitness testimony and child abuse and
3
their conceptions about abuse are influenced by expert testimony.
Experts in these cases are often psychologists testifying either as
1. Lisa Jones & David Finkelhor, The Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, JUV.
JUST. BULL. 1, 2 (2001).
2. Marcus D. Durham & Francis C. Dane, Juror Knowledge of Eyewitness
Behavior: Evidence for the Necessity of Expert Testimony, 14 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY
299, 305 (1999); Susan Morison & Edith Greene, Juror and Expert Knowledge of
Child Sexual Abuse, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 595, 603 (1992); Richard A. Wise &
Martin A. Safer, What US Judges Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 18
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427, 428 (2004).
3. Brian L. Cutler et al., Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An
Empirical Analysis, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 215, 222 (1989); Harmon M. Hosch et al.,
Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy on Jury Decisions, 4 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 287, 292 (1980); Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Does Expert Psychological
Testimony Inform or Influence Juror Decision Making? A Social Cognitive Analysis, 82 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 178, 184-85 (1997); Michael R. Leippe et al., Timing of Eyewitness
Expert Testimony, Jurors’ Need for Cognition, and Case Strength as Determinants of Trial
Verdicts, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 524, 531-32 (2004). But cf. Jennifer L. Devenport &
Brian L. Cutler, Impact of Defense-Only and Opposing Eyewitness Experts on Juror
Judgments, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 569, 573 (2004) (discussing the impact of expert
testimony on the credibility of psychology).
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clinicians or scientists or both. Two reasons for dueling experts in
psychology are the difference in standards of proof between clinical
practice and the scientific method and the fact that psychologists
are often asked to go beyond the data to provide opinions. A third
reason for dueling experts is that the field of psychology and law is
not an exact science. There are often nuances in the body of data
that on the one hand can support the prosecution and on the
other hand can support the defense. Thus, even assuming that
scientists will always make the same conclusions about the same
body of data, an untenable assumption, there are aspects of the
body of data that are useful to both sides of a criminal case. After
addressing each of the former issues, we spend the bulk of the
paper addressing the latter—namely, we examine three areas of
research on child witnesses that are commonly of concern in CSA
cases and discuss how aspects of the data support both the defense
and the prosecution. We focus on (1) children’s memory, (2)
children’s suggestibility, and (3) diagnosing abuse. We have chosen
only three common child witness issues for the purposes of this
review, and readers who are interested in a more thorough
treatment of child witness issues in their full breadth and depth are
4
referred to a number of excellent overviews of the field.
II. BACKGROUND ON CHILD WITNESSES
A. When Do Children Testify?
Most children who testify in criminal court are doing so about
alleged activities perpetrated on themselves, and in particular, they
are testifying about alleged sexual abuse. The primary reason that
4. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM: A
SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (1995); CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD
WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY (Gail S. Goodman & Bette
L. Bottoms eds., 1993); CHILDREN AND THE LAW: THE ESSENTIAL READINGS (Ray Bull
ed., 2001); CHILDREN AS WITNESSES (Helen Dent & Rhona Flin eds., 1992);
CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND FORENSIC
PRACTICE (Helen L. Westcott et al. eds., 2002); EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE
CASES: WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT (Stephen J. Ceci & Helen
Hembrooke eds., 1998); INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE AND
CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (Bette L. Bottoms & Gail S. Goodman eds., 1996); LUCY S.
MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
(1994); MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS (Maria S. Zaragoza et al.
eds., 1995); DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF
CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS (1998).
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this is the case is not because children fail to witness other crimes,
but because they are simply not ideal witnesses. Additionally, the
process of investigative interviewing may, for some children, be
perceived as an extra stressor. We touch on reasons why children
may or may not be effective witnesses in later sections of this
5
paper, but in general, child witnesses are called to testify as a last
resort. In other types of crimes (e.g., theft or assault), other
witnesses or other types of evidence are likely to be present and are
generally preferable types of evidence to statements made by young
children. Even in allegations of child physical abuse, the children’s
bodies can be used as corroboration of their reports, but in sexual
abuse cases, medical corroboration or other witnesses are generally
not available. Thus, when we speak of child witnesses we are most
commonly addressing concerns relevant to child sexual assault
cases.
B. What Lay People Know About Child Abuse and the Influence of
Experts
Jurors have a reasonably accurate perspective about many
6
7
areas of eyewitness research, but jurors, and even judges, have
misconceptions about a number of witness issues, including
8
misconceptions about child sexual abuse. For example, both jurors
and judges believe that eyewitness confidence is related to
9
10
accuracy, which is often not the case. Jurors rely too heavily on
minute details and underestimate the importance of effective
indicators of eyewitness accuracy, such as how long the witness was
able to view the perpetrator (e.g., whether the perpetrator was
wearing a disguise) and what other perceptual conditions were
present (e.g., was it light enough to realistically observe a detailed
face?). Jurors often lack knowledge about factors that interfere with
accurate retention, such as the impact of stress on perception and

5. See infra Part III.
6. Durham & Dane, supra note 2, at 305.
7. Wise & Safer, supra note 2, at 433.
8. Morison & Greene, supra note 2, at 607.
9. George L. Rahaim & Stanley L. Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus Common
Sense: Juror and Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 11
(1982); Wise & Safer, supra note 2, at 432-33.
10. Rahaim & Brodsky, supra note 9, at 11; Gary L. Wells et al., The Confidence
of Eyewitnesses in Their Identifications from Lineups, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOL. SCI. 151, 151-52 (2002).
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11

memory, and are insensitive to biases that are introduced during a
12
criminal investigation.
In addition to misconceptions about eyewitnesses generally,
jurors have stereotypes about child witnesses and sexual assault that
affect their deliberations. The findings on jurors’ age-related
stereotypes are mixed. In this context, an age-related stereotype is
an expectation about what a child of a particular age is capable of
remembering, saying, etc. Some studies have found that child
witnesses are perceived as more credible than adults while still
others have found that child witnesses are perceived as less credible
13
than adults. Beyond general beliefs about child witnesses’ abilities,
effects of jurors’ own gender on their perceptions of child witnesses
are ubiquitous. Researchers have found that women are more
14
conviction prone in sexual assault cases, believe children more
15
16
than men, find children more credible, and are more likely to
11. See, e.g., Sven-Ake Christianson, Emotional Stress and Eyewitness Memory: A
Critical Review, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 284 (1992) (examining the effect of emotional
stress on memory and concluding that the conventional literature oversimplifies
the issue).
12. Durham & Dane, supra note 2, at 305.
13. Bette L. Bottoms & Gail S. Goodman, Perceptions of Children’s Credibility in
Sexual Assault Cases, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 702, 724 (1994) (concluding that
mock jurors found child sexual assault victims equally credible or more credible
than older victims); Natalie J. Gabora et al., The Effects of Complainant Age and Expert
Psychological Testimony in a Simulated Child Sexual Abuse Trial, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
103, 115 (1993) (finding that mock jurors returned guilty verdicts after
deliberations significantly more often when they viewed a younger complainant
than when they viewed an older complainant); Michael R. Leippe & Ann
Romanczyk, Reactions to Child (Versus Adult) Eyewitnesses: The Influence of Jurors’
Preconceptions and Witness Behavior, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 103, 127 (1989)
(comparing five studies and concluding that eyewitness age mattered but that “the
direction of the difference varied across the studies”); Annika Melinder et al.,
Beliefs About Child Witnesses: A Survey of Professionals, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 347,
361-62 (2004) (finding that Norwegian defense attorneys and psychologists
maintained skepticism regarding children’s credibility); Narina Nunez
Nightingale, Juror Reactions to Child Victim Witnesses, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 679, 692
(1993) (discussing why results show older children as less credible); David F. Ross
et al., The Child in the Eyes of the Jury: Assessing Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of the Child
Witness, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 17-18 (1990) (finding jurors viewed a child
witness more favorably than a young adult witness, contrasting previously
published research).
14. Gabora et al., supra note 13, at 116-17; Michelle R. McCauley & Janat
Fraser Parker, When Will a Child Be Believed? The Impact of the Victim’s Age and Juror’s
Gender on Children’s Credibility and Verdict in a Sexual-Abuse Case, 25 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 523, 535 (2001); Jodi A. Quas et al., Effects of Victim, Defendant, and Juror
Gender on Decisions in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1993,
2009-10 (2002).
15. Bottoms & Goodman, supra note 13, at 725; Bette L. Bottoms et al., Jurors’
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recommend that the defendant serve the entire sentence. Finally,
case characteristics also affect jurors’ perceptions about child
witnesses, with some evidence that children are viewed as more
18
credible in civil cases than criminal cases and in sexual assault
19
cases than in robbery cases.
In many studies, expert testimony has been found to have
some effect on jurors’ perceptions and verdicts. Many studies find
20
an effect of expert testimony on jurors’ judgments in mock cases,
21
with some studies finding a limited effect on jurors, an effect on
22
23
only some jurors, or occasionally no effect of experts.
C. Scientific Expert Testimony—Non-Scientific Expert Testimony
Do jurors understand the difference between scientific
testimony and non-scientific testimony? Do they weigh and use the
testimony differently? Both scientific and non-scientific opinions
are allowed in the courts, and different standards may be used to
24
judge each. Non-scientific evidence is based on anecdotal
experience and in many cases is very useful in deliberations.
However, if there are data on the topic being discussed, it seems
clear that the empirical evidence is preferable to anecdotal
experience. If an expert testifies based on his or her experience,
and there is empirical evidence that directly contradicts the
experience of the expert or at least qualifies his or her statements,
the opposing side may not know that that contradictory empirical
Perceptions of Adolescent Sexual Assault Victims Who Have Intellectual Disabilities, 27 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 205, 209 (2003) (finding that women “have more pro[-]victim
perceptions” of child and adolescent sexual abuse victims); Gabora et al., supra
note 13, at 116.
16. McCauley & Parker, supra note 14, at 535.
17. V. Anne Tubb et al., Effects of Suggestive Interviewing and Indirect Evidence on
Child Credibility in a Sexual Abuse Case, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1111, 1121
(1999).
18. Nightingale, supra note 13, at 687.
19. McCauley & Parker, supra note 14, at 536.
20. Cutler et al., supra note 3, at 222-23; Hosch et al., supra note 3, at 292;
Kovera et al., supra note 3, at 184; Leippe et al., supra note 3, at 531.
21. Harmon M. Hosch, A Comparison of Three Studies of the Influence of Expert
Testimony on Jurors, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 297, 300-01 (1980).
22. Robert A. Schuller et al., Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence: The
Impact of Alternative Forms of Expert Testimony on Mock Jurors’ Decisions, 36 CANADIAN J.
BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 127, 134 (2004).
23. Devenport & Cutler, supra note 3, at 574.
24. BRUCE D. SALES & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, EXPERTS IN COURT: RECONCILING
LAW, SCIENCE, AND PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 34, 39 (2005).
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evidence exists. In this case, the ability of the other side to
recognize when an opposing expert should be hired is the only
legal safeguard for anecdotal evidence being given when
conflicting empirical evidence exists. There is some evidence to
suggest that jurors weight anecdotal, non-scientific testimony with
25
more strength than scientific testimony. Further, among scientific
experts, jurors give more weight to expert testimony that goes
beyond describing the scientific studies to tie those studies to the
26
case at hand.
We bring up these issues not because there are answers but
because they are part of the reason why the court may see vastly
different opinions between two psychological experts—particularly
if one expert is testifying based on his or her experiences and one
expert is testifying based on his or her knowledge of the scientific
literature.
III. THREE AREAS OF CHILD WITNESS RESEARCH
A. Children’s Memory
1.

What the Prosecution Should Know

Young children are capable of accurately recalling
autobiographical events over relatively long time periods. There are
numerous studies that highlight the strengths of young children’s
memories when asked neutral questions, including after longer
delays, and suggest that by age 2.5, children are capable of long27
lasting memories of salient events. Even in the suggestibility
25. Brian H. Bornstein, The Impact of Different Types of Expert Scientific Testimony
on Mock Jurors’ Liability Verdicts, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 429, 435 (2004); Daniel A.
Krauss et al., The Effects of Rational and Experiential Information Processing of Expert
Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 801, 814 (2004). But see Laura
S. Guy & John F. Edens, Juror Decision-making in a Mock Sexually Violent Predator
Trial: Gender Differences in the Impact of Divergent Types of Expert Testimony, 21 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 215 (2003) (illustrating an exception).
26. R. Edward Geiselman, et al., Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Juror Decisions,
20(3) AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 21, 25 (2002); James D. Griffith, et al., The Effects of
Expert Testimony on Mock Jurors’ Decision Making and Memory, 20(2) AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHOL. 69, 77 (2002).
27. See, e.g., Robyn Fivush, Children’s Recollections of Traumatic and Nontraumatic
Events, 10 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 699 (1998); Robyn Fivush et al., Content and
Consistency in Young Children’s Autobiographical Recall, 14 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 373
(1991); Robyn Fivush & April Schwarzmueller, Say It Once Again: Effects of Repeated
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literature, most studies report that children in the control group
28
(i.e., no suggestion) recall events with high rates of accuracy.
Evidence from both sets of data indicates that in the absence of
suggestion even very young preschoolers can provide highly
accurate reports.
In addition, recent reviews of the literature of emotional
memory and memory for traumatic experiences indicate that
children remember and recall such highly stressful events as well as
29
they recall neutral events. Indeed, studies with both adults and
children reveal that emotional, negative information tends to be
30
remembered better than positive or neutral information.
Moreover, even at very young ages, children’s accounts of negative
personal experiences are detailed. In one study, two-year-old
children were able to provide coherent and detailed recollections
of traumatic injuries and ensuing emergency room treatments that
31
they had experienced several days previously. The children’s
recall of the central details of the target events was still robust when
tested six and twelve months later.

Questions on Children’s Event Recall, 8 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 555 (1995); Robyn Fivush
et al., Structure and Coherence of Preschoolers’ Personal Narratives Over Time: Implications
for Childhood Amnesia, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 32 (1995); Robyn Fivush
& Nina R. Hamond, Time and Again: Effects of Repetition and Retention Interval on 2
Year Olds’ Event Recall, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 259 (1989); Gail S.
Goodman et al., Nearly 4 Years After an Event: Children’s Eyewitness Memory and Adults’
Perceptions of Children’s Accuracy, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 849 (2002); Irit
Hershkowitz, Children’s Responses to Open-ended Utterances in Investigative Interviews, 6
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 49 (2001); Irit Hershkowitz et al., The
Relationships Among Interviewer Utterance Type, CBCA Scores and the Richness of
Children’s Responses, 2 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 169 (1997); Carole
Peterson et al., Providing Misleading and Reinstatement Information a Year After It
Happened: Effects on Long-term Memory, 12 MEMORY 1 (2004); Debra A. Poole &
Lawrence T. White, Effects of Question Repetition on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children
and Adults, 27 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 975 (1991).
28. See, e.g., Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of Stereotypes
and Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568, 571
(1995).
29. Ingrid M. Cordon, et al., Memory for Traumatic Experiences in Early
Childhood, 24 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 101, 122 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Dorthe Berntsen, Involuntary Memories of Emotional Events: Do
Memories of Traumas and Extremely Happy Events Differ?, 15 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 135 (2001); Gail S. Goodman et al., Children’s Memory for Stressful Events,
37 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 109 (1991).
31. Mark L. Howe et al., How Can I Remember When “I” Wasn’t There: Long-term
Retention of Traumatic Memories and Emergence of the Cognitive Self, 3 CONSCIOUSNESS &
COGNITION 327, 338 (1994).
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What the Defense Should Know

It is a common finding in memory research that younger
children provide fewer details than older children in the context of
32
neutral interviews. In addition, although children are generally
accurate when they are interviewed by a neutral experimenter who
asks few leading questions, and when they are not given any
motivation to produce distorted reports, there is occasionally a very
small percentage of children who give bizarre or sexualized answers
to direct questions. For example, in a study of children’s reports of
medical examinations, one child, who had not received a genital
exam, falsely reported that the pediatrician had touched her
buttocks and on further questioning claimed that it tickled and
33
that the doctor used a long stick. Thus, young children may
occasionally make spontaneous, bizarre, and unfounded
allegations, and there are currently not any methods for predicting
which children will do so.
3.

What the Whole Truth Is

In neutral interviews, very young children (i.e., as young as
2.5) have been shown to be capable in some circumstances of
providing relatively accurate reports of past events over relatively
long time periods. These reports are less detailed on average than
reports provided by older children and adults. However, these free
recall reports, while relatively accurate, are not free from minor
errors, and, furthermore, in relatively neutral direct questioning, a
very small percentage of children will provide inaccurate details
even about bodily touch.
There is a large amount of literature examining the effects of
stress on the accuracy and completeness of memory that suggests
moderate stress generally fails to hinder memory and may facilitate
34
memory.
32. Michael E. Lamb et al., Age Differences in Young Children’s Responses to OpenEnded Invitations in the Course of Forensic Interviews, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 926, 929 (2003); Poole & White, supra note 27, at 978. But see
Hershkowitzs, supra note 27, at 173 (opposing results, in which older children
used more words, but not more details, in their responses).
33. Karen J. Saywitz et al., Children’s Memories of a Physical Examination
Involving Genital Touch: Implications for Reports of Child Sexual Abuse, 59 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 682, 687 (1991).
34. For review, see Kathy Pezdek & Jennifer Taylor, Memories of Traumatic
Events in Children and Adults, in MEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY IN THE FORENSIC
INTERVIEW 165-83 (Mitchell Eisen et al. eds., 2001).
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B. Children’s Suggestibility
1.

What the Defense Should Know

Young children’s reports of past events are susceptible to
35
distortion via adults’ suggestions. This susceptibility is called
“suggestibility” and can be defined as the degree to which the
encoding, storage, retrieval, and reporting of events can be
influenced by a range of internal and external factors that can be
present before or after the event. Factors such as question
36
37
38
repetition, yes/no questions, misleading questions, repeated
39
40
41
interviewing, plausible suggestions, stereotyping, anatomical
35. See, e.g., DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF
CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS 48-49 (1998); Stephen J. Ceci &
Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113
PSYCHOL. BULL. 403 (1993); Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The
Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
33 (2000); Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility Research: A
Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1999); Jodi A. Quas et al., Questioning the Child
Witness: What Can We Conclude From the Research Thus Far? 1 TRAUMA VIOLENCE &
ABUSE 223 (2000).
36. Debra Ann Poole & Lawrence T. White, Two Years Later: Effects of Question
Repetition and Retention Interval on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children and Adults, 29
DEV. PSYCHOL. 844, 851 (1993); Poole & White, supra note 27, at 983-84.
37. Michael S. Brady et al., Young Children’s Responses to Yes-No Questions:
Patterns and Problems, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 47, 52-53 (1999); V. Heather Fritzley &
Kang Lee, Do Young Children Always Say Yes to Yes-No Questions? A Metadevelopmental
Study of the Affirmation Bias, 74 CHILD DEV. 1297, 1307-08 (2003).
38. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 35, at 432. See also Gail S. Goodman & Jennifer
M. Schaaf, Over a Decade of Research on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony: What Have We
Learned? Where Do We Go From Here? 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. S5 (1997)
(“[I]nterviews should not be judged dichotomously as either leading or nonleading, but rather viewed as falling along a ‘leadingness continuum.’”); Elizabeth
F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 560
(1975) (suggesting “that questions asked immediately after an event can introduce
new--not necessarily correct--information, which is then added to the memorial
representation of the event, thereby causing its reconstruction or alteration”);
Claudia M. Roebers & Wolfgang Schneider, The Impact of Misleading Questions on
Eyewitness Memory in Children and Adults, 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 509 (2000)
(“How suggestibility is assessed is . . . also important and children’s responses to
misleading questions may not reflect their memory for the original event.”).
39. Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T. White, Tell Me Again and Again: Stability and
Change in the Repeated Testimonies of Children and Adults, in 1 MEMORY AND TESTIMONY
IN THE CHILD WITNESS 24-43 (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. eds., 1995).
40. Kathy Pezdek et al., Planting False Childhood Memories: The Role of Event
Plausibility, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. 437, 440 (1997).
41. Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of Stereotypes and
Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568, 573 (1995).
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43

dolls, and invocation of peer conformity have been associated
with errors in children’s reports to adult interviewers. When several
of these factors are combined, rates of acceptance of suggested
44
information can be very high. Younger children are generally
more vulnerable to the deleterious effects of an interviewer’s
45
misleading suggestions than older children, and some children
46
will persist in their false beliefs despite challenges. Moreover,
47
some children will misreport painful events, and even genital,
48
anal, or other abuse-relevant touch. Examples of abuse-relevant
false statements range from claiming a strange man “put something

42. Mark D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat, The Utility of Anatomical Dolls and
Drawings in Child Forensic Interviews, in MEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY IN THE FORENSIC
INTERVIEW 383-408 (Mitchell L. Eisen et al., eds., 2002). See generally Maggie Bruck
et al., External and Internal Sources of Variation in the Creation of False Reports in
Children, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 289 (1997) (reviewing the
correlation between the use of anatomical dolls and the errors in children’s
reports to adult interviewers).
43. Matthew H. Scullin et al., Measurement of Individual Differences in Children’s
Suggestibility Across Situations, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 233, 243 (2002).
44. Sena Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing: The Effects of Reinforcement on
Children’s Mundane and Fantastic Claims, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 38, 43 (2000); Sena
Garven et al., More Than Suggestion: The Effect of Interviewing Techniques from the
McMartin Preschool Case, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 354 (1998).
45. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 35, at 56-57.
46. Leichtman & Ceci, supra note 41, at 571.
47. Peter A. Ornstein et al., Young Children’s Long-Term Retention of Medical
Experiences: Implications for Testimony, in MEMORY PERFORMANCE AND COMPETENCIES:
ISSUES IN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 349-71 (Franz E. Weiner & Wolfgang
Schneider eds., 1995); Maggie Bruck et al., “I Hardly Cried When I Got My Shot!”:
Influencing Children’s Reports About a Visit to Their Pediatrician, 66 CHILD DEV. 193,
202 (1995).
48. Mitchell L. Eisen et al., Memory and Suggestibility in Maltreated Children: New
Research Relevant to Evaluating Allegations of Abuse, in TRUTH IN MEMORY 163, 179-80
(Steven Jay Lynn & Kevin M. McConkey eds., 1998); Gail S. Goodman & Alison
Clarke-Stewart, Suggestibility in Children’s Testimony: Implications for Sexual Abuse
Investigations, in THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S RECOLLECTIONS 92, 102-05
(John Doris ed., 1991); Maggie Bruck et al., Anatomically Detailed Dolls Do Not
Facilitate Preschoolers’ Reports of a Pediatric Examination Involving Genital Touching, 1 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 95, 101-03 (1995); Gail S. Goodman et al.,
Children’s Reactions to and Memory for a Stressful Event: Influences of Age, Anatomical
Dolls, Knowledge, and Parental Attachment, 1 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 54, 70
(1997); Leslie Rudy & Gail S. Goodman, Effects of Participation on Children’s Reports:
Implications for Children’s Testimony, 27 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 527, 533 (1991);
Karen J. Saywitz et al., Children’s Memories of a Physical Examination Involving Genital
Touch: Implications for Reports of Child Sexual Abuse, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 682, 685-87 (1991); Margaret S. Steward et al., Interviewing Young Children
About Body Touch and Handling, 61 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD
DEV. 1, 114 (1996).
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49

yucky into their mouths” during a visit to a science exhibit to
50
claiming that someone took off their clothes and kissed them or
51
inserted objects in their anogenital cavities.
2.

What the Prosecution Should Know

Many children do not succumb to suggestion, and which
children will or will not succumb to suggestion cannot currently be
identified. The suggestibility studies described above also
demonstrate that some children are quite resistant to all of the
suggestive factors listed above. Although we have done a great deal
of work in the area of individual differences in children’s
52
suggestibility, we have not been successful at identifying who these
children are, at least not with any confidence. In the majority of the
studies cited above, fewer than 50% of children made false reports.
Hence, when social science research is introduced in court, it
needs to be accompanied with the caveat that not all children are
equally vulnerable to suggestive influence and we have no sound
and sure method of knowing whether the children involved in the
53
particular case at hand are the rule or the exception.
Even though some children will falsely report genital and anal
touch, children appear to be less susceptible to suggestions about
54
these topics. Further, most of the research cited above involved
multiple suggestive factors, multiple interviews, repeated suggestive
questions, and sometimes all of these. The effect of a single leading
question in an otherwise neutral interview is not clear. In addition,
as discussed in the section on children’s memory, unless suggestion
is present, most young children are relatively accurate in their

49. Debra A. Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Interviewing Preschoolers: Effects of
Nonsuggestive Techniques, Parental Coaching, and Leading Questions on Reports of
Nonexperienced Events, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 129, 143 (1995).
50. Stephen J. Lepore & Barbara Sesco, Distorting Children’s Reports and
Interpretations of Events Through Suggestion, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 108, 112 (1994).
51. Bruck et al., supra note 48, at 102.
52. See generally Jodi A. Quas et al., Emotion and Memory: Children’s Long-Term
Remembering, Forgetting, and Suggestibility, 72 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 235,
239-40 (1999); Jodi A. Quas et al., Individual Differences in Children’s and Adults’
Suggestibility and False Event Memory, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 359
(1997); Scullin et al., supra note 43.
53. See generally EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES: WHAT CAN AND
SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT, supra note 4.
54. Rudy & Goodman, supra note 48, at 533; Saywitz et al., supra note 48, at
688-89; Steward et al., supra note 48, at 113-14.
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55

reports of salient life events.
In general, it is more difficult to implant false memories for
56
implausible events than plausible events, to change details for
57
central events than peripheral events, and to implant memories of
58
more salient (e.g., bodily touch) events rather less salient events.
Finally, although some studies come close, none of the studies
cited has attempted to implant completely false memories about an
entire sexual abuse event in children. This would clearly be
unethical and this type of study is not anticipated.
3.

What the Whole Truth Is

Researchers have not currently found boundary conditions on
the upper or lower end of suggestibility. The issue of interviewing
techniques and suggestibility is a balance between omission and
commission errors. Certain interviewing techniques, such as direct
questions, increase commission errors (i.e., suggestibility—when a
child assents to something that did not happen) but also reduce
omission errors (i.e., when a child who experienced something fails
to report it). However, more neutral techniques, such as free recall,
while they may decrease commission errors, also appear to result in
increased omission errors.
The relationship between external pressure and children’s
suggestibility appears to be continuous with more pressure related
to more suggestibility and less pressure related to less suggestibility.
However, some children will still make false reports, even for bodily
touch, in relatively neutral interviews, and some children will still
make correct reports about bodily touch (i.e., correctly denying if
they did not experience the event) even under highly suggestive
conditions. Still, boundary conditions might exist and researchers
are, rightfully, constrained in what studies they will conduct by
ethics. For example, researchers have not systematically tried to
55. See supra Part III.A.
56. Giuliana A. L. Mazzoni et al., Changing Beliefs About Implausible
Autobiographical Events: A Little Plausibility Goes a Long Way, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 51, 58 (2001); Kathy Pezdek & Danelle Hodge, Planting False
Childhood Memories in Children: The Role of Event Plausibility, 70 CHILD DEV. 887, 893
(1999).
57. Camilla Gobbo, Assessing the Effects of Misinformation on Children’s Recall:
How and When Makes a Difference, 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 163, 169 (2000).
58. Jodi A. Quas & Jennifer M. Schaaf, Children’s Memories of Experienced and
Nonexperienced Events Following Repeated Interviews, 83 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 304, 320-21 (2002).
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implant memories of false sexual abuse in children using pressure
from parents and presumably never will.
C. Diagnosing Abuse
The title of this section reflects a belief of many jurors,
attorneys, judges, and clinicians that mental health professionals
can diagnose abuse. By diagnose abuse, we mean the ability to
59
determine whether individual children have been abused. We
separate this section into clinicians’ ability to detect abuse, to
predict abuse status from behaviors, and to detect false reports.
1.

What the Prosecution Wants to Hear

Clinicians’ ability to detect abuse: Mental health professionals
have structured assessment tools based on clinical experience and
on rates of behaviors occurring in abused and non-abused children
that major mental health organizations have published to aid in the
60
assessment of children and adolescents where abuse is suspected.
In addition to guidelines published by mental health organizations,
there are numerous forensic evaluation tools that have been
61
published in peer review journals. There is fairly widespread use
of these tools in the forensic evaluation community.
Predicting abuse status from behaviors: There are studies showing

59. Clearly, clinicians are trained in diagnosis, but in the diagnosis of
disorders based on current symptoms and the patient’s history, not in the
diagnosis of past events based on current symptoms. The therapist may believe
that abuse happened because the patient reports abuse, but this reflects the need
of the therapist to work with the information available rather than a special ability
to detect abuse from symptoms.
60. See, e.g., William Bernet et al., Practice Parameters for the Forensic Evaluation of
Children and Adolescents Who May Have Been Physically or Sexually Abused, 36 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 37S (Supp. 1997).
61. See, e.g., Richard A. Gardner, Clinical Evaluation of Alleged Child Sex Abuse in
Custody Disputes, in 7 INNOVATIONS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE: A SOURCE BOOK 61-76
(Peter A. Keller & Steven R. Heyman eds., 1988); JONATHAN W. GOULD,
CONDUCTING SCIENTIFICALLY CRAFTED CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 196-217 (Jim
Nageotte et al. eds., 1998); Richard A. Gardner, Interview Criteria for Assessing
Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Children and Adults, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOANALYSIS &
DYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY 297 (2003); Richard A. Gardner, Differentiating Between True
and False Sex-Abuse Accusations in Child-Custody Disputes, 21 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE
1 (1994); Dennis M. Harrison, Guidelines for the Use of Videotape in the Validation of
Child Sex Abuse, 3 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 18 (1987); Alan J. Klein, Forensic Issues
in Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody/Visitation Litigation, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
247 (1994).
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that abused children are more likely to show certain behaviors
63
than non-abused children.
Detecting false reports: There is some evidence that adults can
detect children who are lying by using a combination of their
64
nonverbal cues and utilizing checklists to analyze their statements.
2.

What the Defense Wants to Hear

Clinicians’ ability to detect abuse: The use of clinical experience to
diagnose abuse is beyond the ability of mental health professions.
Clinicians are trained to diagnose current disorders from current
and historical symptoms. Even when a diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) from abuse is made, the portion of the
diagnosis that is “from abuse” is based on the report of the child or
the parent, not any special skills of the clinician. In fact, there is
evidence that mental health professionals are not able to identify
65
abused children from known populations or identify false
66
memories when they are known and differ widely from each other
67
in their estimates of the likelihood of abuse in a single case. In
addition, the forensic evaluations that rely on children’s behaviors
68
are not scientifically valid because of diverse symptomology. In
their manual, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry (AACAP) clearly states that symptomology is not
diagnostic:

62. E.g., sexualized play.
63. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on
Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164
(1993) (reviewing studies that demonstrated that sexually abused children had
more symptoms than non-abused children); Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983) (discussing
the reactions and effects of child abuse accommodation syndrome).
64. Aldert Vrij et al., Detecting Deceit Via Analyses of Verbal and Nonverbal
Behavior in Children and Adults, 30 HUM. COMM. RES. 8, 30-31 (2004).
65. Marc A. Lindberg et al., Comparisons of Three Different Investigative Interview
Techniques with Young Children, 164 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 5, 18 (2003).
66. Stephen J. Ceci & Mary Lyn C. Huffman, How Suggestible Are Preschool
Children? Cognitive and Social Factors, 36 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 948, 957 (1997).
67. Thomas M. Horner et al., The Biases of Child Sexual Abuse Experts: Believing
Is Seeing, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 281, 287-89 (1993); Thomas M.
Horner et al., Clinical Expertise and the Assessment of Child Sexual Abuse, 32 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 925, 928 (1993).
68. Margaret A. Hagen, Faith in the Model and Resistance to Research, 10
CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 344, 344 (2003); Kendall-Tackett et al., supra note
63, at 173.
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Abused children manifest diverse symptoms, a variety of
emotional, behavioral, and somatic reactions. These
symptoms are neither specific nor pathognomonic, in that
the same symptoms may occur without any history of
abuse. The symptoms manifested by abused children can
be organized into clinical patterns. Although it may be
helpful to note whether a particular case falls into one of
these patterns, that is not in itself diagnostic of child
abuse. The following studies are often cited as examples
of clinical patterns associated with abuse. Since this is an
evolving and developing area, these studies are not
definitive. In general, the research on child maltreatment
has been limited because of the wide variance in
definitions of abuse and because of the absence of
69
adequate control groups.
The AACAP goes beyond this to warn clinicians that their
manual is primarily based on current consensus, not science:
The recommendations regarding specific diagnostic
evaluations and treatment interventions reflect those
methods of practice, which are either supported by
methodologically sound empirical studies and/or are
considered a standard of care by competent clinicians.
However, the general paucity of sound scientific data regarding
childhood psychiatry disorders and their treatment necessitated
that most of the recommendations set forth in these parameters
were based on clinical consensus. Those practices that are
described as having limited or no research data and also
lack of clinical consensus regarding their efficacy may still
be used in some selected cases, but the clinician should be
aware of the limitations and document the rationale for
70
their use.
Although many of these tools have been published in peer
reviewed journals, their use and publication emphasize the need
for courts to recognize that peer reviewed journal publication does
69. William Bernet et al., Practice Parameters for the Forensic Evaluation of
Children and Adolescents Who May Have Been Physically or Sexually Abused, 36 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 423 (1997) (no page numbers in original).
70. Id. (emphasis added).
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not necessarily indicate the presence of empirical validation.
Finally, we agree that consensus may be the best available tool
when scientific data are not available. However, a number of
studies have shown that clinical forensic evaluation tools are not
71
diagnostic and have high error rates. Thus, it is not the case that
the forensic evaluations have not been empirically studied and no
data exist to support or argue against their use. Instead, a number
of these techniques have been shown to lack validity.
72
Predicting abuse status from behaviors: Postdiction has no basis in
the scientific community and indeed involves a basic error in
73
logic. Further, the data on symptomology of abused and nonabused children are too variable to use to postdict abuse status.
Many non-abused children will exhibit a given symptom and many
abused children will not. In hypothetical scenarios, even high rates
of a behavior in abused children and low rates in non-abused
children are likely to result in worse than chance predictions of
74
abuse status, even when using multiple behaviors.
71. See, e.g., Kerry M. Drach et al., The Diagnostic Utility of Sexual Behavior
Problems in Diagnosing Sexual Abuse in a Forensic Child Abuse Evaluation Clinic, 25
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 489 (2001) (suggesting that medical professionals should
use caution in relying on sexual behavior problems as a diagnostic indicator of
abuse); Steve Herman, Improving Decision Making in Forensic Child Sexual Abuse
Evaluations, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 87 (2005) (examining the current lack of
adequate psychometric reliability and validity in clinical forensic tools).
72. I.e., making a probabilistic statement about the likelihood of abuse based
on current symptoms.
73. Those who have studied logic will be familiar with the error of affirming
the antecedent. In logical terms, this is when we know that P leads to Q (PÆQ),
we know that Q is present, and then we make the error of concluding that the
presence of Q means that P is true (QÆP). In a child abuse case, this would be the
same as saying if abuse (P) leads to sexual play (Q), and a child engages in sexual
play (Q), then we can conclude that the child has been abused (P). This is a
logical error because other events could lead to Q besides P. For example, ZÆQ
or XÆQ. In our example, other events could lead to child sexual play such as
discussing sex with an older sibling, curiosity, or coming into contact with sexual
material. Because other events could lead to sexual play, we cannot conclude that
abuse occurred because sexual play is present.
74. There is an imperfect, probabilistic relationship between any symptom
and abuse. Some abused children will not display the symptom and some nonabused children will display the symptom. In theory this probabilistic relationship
could be used to make predictions about the likelihood that a given individual has
been abused much like we might be able to make a prediction about a single coin
flip.
Postdiction at a probabilistic level is theoretically possible if the following
are known in the population of interest: (1) How many abused children from that
population exhibit the symptom?, (2) How many non-abused children from that
same population exhibit the symptom?, and (3) What is the base rate of abuse in
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Experts across the country have written about the dangers of
using current symptoms to back-diagnose abuse in children; they
75
firmly state that it is not currently possible. Indeed, the scholar
who first developed the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
76
Syndrome (CSAAS) has written of the dangers of using CSAAS as
a diagnostic tool and the inappropriateness of using it as
77
postdiction evidence in a legal setting. Even those who suggest
that postdiction is possible severely restrict the circumstances under
which it would be possible to engage in it and clearly state that only
a probabilistic statement, rather than a definitive conclusion, might
be made.
Detecting false reports: What about using children’s statements
and the consistency and details of their statements to validate their
claims? Consistency and details of a child’s report are some of the
most important criteria used by professionals in evaluating the
78
reliability of children’s allegations of abuse, and inconsistency in
young children’s reports lowers their credibility in the eyes of mock
79
jurors even though some types of inconsistency are normal for
that population?
Using the example of sexual play, if 60% of abused children display the
symptom and 10% of non-abused children play sexually and the base rate of abuse
is 5%, that leaves us with the following arithmetic for 100 randomly selected
children. Using the base rates we would expect 5 abused children and 95 nonabused children. Three of the abused children would play sexually and 9.5 of the
non-abused children would play sexually. This leaves our predictive power for
sexualized play at 3:9.5, or we will be right about 25% of the time and wrong 75%
of the time.
Does this change if we have more symptoms? Unfortunately, the answer is
no. If we have a bed-wetting, hostile child with poor grades who plays sexually with
dolls, this information is not more predictive. This is because we would expect that
fewer of the non-abused and abused children will exhibit all of the symptoms. For
example, only 30% of the non-abused and 5% of the abused might show that
constellation of symptoms leaving our predictive power for the set of symptoms at
1.5:5. This time we again would be right about 25% of the time and wrong about
75% of the time.
75. See, e.g., Lucy Berliner & Jon R. Conte, Sexual Abuse Evaluations: Conceptual
and Empirical Obstacles, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 111 (1993); Faith Hagan et al.,
Assessing the Accuracy of Young Children’s Reports: Lessons from the Investigation of Child
Sexual Abuse, 7 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 1 (1998); Tamara Penix Sbraga &
William O’Donohue, Post Hoc Reasoning in Possible Cases of Child Sexual Abuse:
Symptoms of Inconclusive Origins, 10 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 320 (2003).
76. Summit, supra note 63.
77. Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,
1 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 153 (1992).
78. Jon R. Conte et al., Evaluating Children’s Reports of Sexual Abuse: Results from
a Survey of Professionals, 61 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 428, 435-36 (1991).
79. Michael R. Leippe et al., Eyewitness Persuasion: How and How Well Do Fact
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80

accurate statements made by children. By combing children’s
reports for a combination of factors, such as consistency and
81
details, statement validity analysis (SVA) has some success in
differentiating between truthful and deceptive reports. However,
even those who find that SVA distinguishes between children who
are lying and telling the truth caution that the techniques have
82
substantial error rates and that factors other than veracity affect
83
statement analyses. In fact, even in the study that showed the best
prediction rates of lying and truth-telling in children and adults
using a combination of verbal and nonverbal indicators, the error
rates were always higher than 22%. Further, false reporting can be
caused by deception, but false reporting can also be caused by false
memories caused by suggestion. There is no evidence that any type
of statement analysis or other technique can distinguish between
84
false memories and true memories.

Finders Judge the Accuracy of Adults’ and Children’s Memory Reports?, 63 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 193-94 (1992); David F. Ross et al., The Child in the Eyes of the
Jury: Assessing Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of the Child Witness, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5,
19 (1990).
80. I.e., to contain different pieces of accurate information across interviews.
See generally Robyn Fivush et al., Content and Consistency in Young Children’s
Autobiographical Recall, 14 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 373 (1991).
81. Readers may be familiar with Content-Based Criteria Analysis (CBCA),
which is a sub-section of statement validity analysis (SVA).
82. Michael E. Lamb, Assessments of Children’s Credibility in Forensic Contexts, 7
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 43, 44 (1998). See generally Jaume Masip et al.,
The Detection of Deception with the Reality Monitoring Approach: A Review of the Empirical
Evidence, 11 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 99 (2005); Aldert Vrij, Criteria-Based Content
Analysis: A Qualitative Review of the First 37 Studies, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3
(2005).
83. I.e., children who are younger get lower scores and repeated events get
higher scores. See Julie A. Buck et al., Age Differences in Criteria-Based Content Analysis
Scores in Typical Child Sexual Abuse Interviews, 23 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
267, 279 (2002); Kathy Pezdek et al., Detecting Deception in Children: Event Familiarity
Affects Criterion-Based Content Analysis Ratings, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 119, 124
(2004); Aldert Vrij et al., Will the Truth Come Out?: The Effect of Deception, Age, Status,
Coaching, and Social Skills on CBCA Scores, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 274 (2002);
Aldert Vrij et al., Let Me Inform You How to Tell a Convincing Story: CBCA and Reality
Monitoring Scores as a Function of Age, Coaching, and Deception, 36 CANADIAN J.
BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 113, 123 (2004b).
84. One study found weak differentiation on CBCA criteria between true and
false memories, but was never published. Mary Lyn Huffman & Stephen J. Ceci,
Can Criteria-Based Content Analysis Distinguish True and False Beliefs of Preschoolers? An
Exploratory Analysis (1997) (unpublished manuscript, as cited in Charles L. Ruby &
John C. Brigham, The Usefulness of the Criteria-Based Content Analysis Technique in
Distinguishing Between Truthful and Fabricated Allegations: A Critical Review, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 705, 724-25 (1997)).
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What the Whole Truth Is

Clearly, the data presented in this section is slanted towards
the defense. This is because the current body of data indicates that
although we may, in some circumstances, be better than chance at
detecting abuse, lying, and false memories, our ability to detect
these occurrences does not rise to the level of admissibility as
85
probative evidence in a courtroom. This is compounded by the
fact that in some instances prediction levels are worse than chance,
and we are unable to provide parameters to the court that could
identify when our judgments are likely to be better than chance or
worse than chance. This is not to say that we will never be able to
provide evidence that speaks to the ultimate issue, although we
have listed some of the obstacles to this goal. However, at this time,
there is no evidence that abuse can be confidently predicted from
behaviors or statements.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS
This paper provides a substantial review of important research
and theory in three major areas of research relevant to the
prosecution and defense of criminal cases involving child witnesses,
with particular emphasis on child sexual assault cases—namely,
children’s memory, children’s suggestibility, and the ability to
diagnose abuse. As is the case with any presentation of social
science research in a legal setting, it is critically important to
remind the reader of the limitations of applying the scholarship to
the legal arena. In particular, we emphasize two caveats.
First, there is no substitute for expertise. The data presented in
this review are not exhaustive. Indeed, a review of “all” of the
psychological literature on child witnesses would require an entire
book, if not several books. The authors have used their own
expertise to select themes in the literature and have made attempts
to highlight the most important issues in a balanced manner. This
means that many other issues were left out and the reader is
encouraged to refer to a number of edited books on the topic of
86
child witnesses. Even within the selected topics, not all
85. John E.B. Meyers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination,
Cross-Examination, and Impeachment, 18 PAC. L.J. 801, 840-846 (1987) (discussing
issues of probity and admissibility of evidence relating to credibility of child
witnesses).
86. See supra note 4.
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information could be presented. Therefore, there are fine
distinctions within the selected body of literature, of which the
authors may well be aware, that were not presented in this review.
While this review provides a good overview of three areas of
research related to child witnesses, reading the review will not
result in the same breadth, depth, and flexibility of knowledge that
an expert in the field will have attained.
Second, all descriptions of data in this manuscript are
probabilistic. This is the nature of social science data. There were
children in most studies who behaved in opposition to the reported
trend. A statement such as “by age 2.5 children are capable of longlasting memories of salient events” should always be interpreted as
meaning “on average.” Some 2.6 year olds are not capable of such
remembering, some 2.4 year olds are capable of such
remembering, and some events will not be remembered by any
given child. In addition, many statements reflect differences from a
control group, and thus these statements may not be true for the
majority of children. For example, consider the statement
“children who are pressured report more false events.” This
statement is made in comparison to a control group and thus
would be more completely stated as “children who are pressured
report more false events than children who were not pressured.” As the
reader can see, it is possible that fewer than 50% of children who
received pressure reported false events as long as more children
who received pressure reported false events. Both of these example
statements are not any less true or informative about human
behavior because of the variability between people and conditions,
but for these reasons averages cannot be applied with confidence
to individuals.
Because the findings are complex, nuanced, and cannot be
confidently applied to individual cases, both the courts and the
expert psychological witnesses may wonder about the utility of
attempting to use psychological data in what is often an
acrimonious, and by definition adversarial, criminal justice system.
What is clear from the work presented on jurors’, lawyers’, and
judges’ knowledge is that jurors have many misconceptions about
eyewitnesses, including child witnesses, than expert testimony can
attempt to clarify. As long as the data are applied appropriately,
there are many ways in which research in the field of psychology
and the law has had, and can continue to have, beneficial impacts
on the prosecution and defense of criminal cases.
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